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ARTICLES
ONE NATION'S DREAM, ANOTHER'S
REALITY: HOUSING JUSTICE IN SWEDEN
Deborah Kenn*
I. INTRODUCTION
A country where everyone lives in decent housing which
costs less than 25% of their income? A country where everyone
has the choice between rental housing, cooperative housing,
and single-family housing? A country where lack of individual
financial resources does not relegate one to living in central
city slums? A dream world? No. Affordable, quality housing for
all exists in Sweden. It remains a pipe dream in the United
States, but Sweden's success at housing provision serves as an
available prototype for United States housing policy and pro-
grams.
After detailing the history and contemporary status of the
housing crisis in the United States in Part II, Part HI of this
article offers a description of Sweden's housing policy and
programs as a model for addressing housing problems in the
United States. Part IV explains how learning from Sweden's
successful governmental efforts to provide housing justice for
all and combining those techniques with existing legal mecha-
nisms for the preservation of affordable housing can create a
framework for resolving the United States' housing crisis.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Housing and Finance Clinic,
Syracuse University College of Law, Syracuse, New York. BA. 1977, Eisenhower
College; J.D. 1980, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and
Jurisprudence. Thanks and gratitude to Julie Bergkamp and Stacey Stritzel who
provided a commitment to excellence in researching this article.
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II. THE UNITED STATES' HouSING CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES
In 1975, the United Nations assessed the global
community's dismal progress in providing housing to its peo-
ple. Having deemed adequate housing to be an essential for all,
the United Nations was appalled by the woefully inadequate
national responses to deplorable housing conditions.' North
America served as a glaring example of misplaced priorities
and corrupt social values in which "housing for the needy must
take second place to sports arenas or modern speedways."' Al-
though much richer in resources than other countries, the
United States' lack of a national housing policy fostered an
affordable housing crisis In 1949, the United States legisla-
ture began paying lip service to a national policy articulated as
providing "a decent home and a suitable living environment for
every American family.'" Despite stated intentions, more than
adequate resources, and almost three decades to put these
intentions into action, the United States could not claim a
comprehensive, working national housing policy.5 By 1975, the
lack of a national housing policy and a widening "affordability
gap" between the cost of housing and the ability of people to
pay for it led the United Nations to compare the U.S. housing
1. See U.N. DEPr OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, NON-PROFIT HOUSING
ASSOCIATIONS: ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION at 68,
U.N. Doc. ESA/OTCISEM/75/2, U.N. Sales No. E.75.N.4 (1975) [hereinafter NON-
PROFIT HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS].
2. Id. at 67.
3. See id. at 2. For discussions on the United States' lack of national hous-
ing policy, see JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING
RENTAL HOUSING 13 (1988); John A. Hird et al., Housing in San Francisco: Shelter
in the Market Economy, in HOUSING MARKETS AND HOUSING INSTITUTIONS: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 157, 178 (Bjdrm H~rsman & John M. Quigley eds.,
1991) [hereinafter HOUSING MARKETS]; Bjdrn HArsman & John M. Quigley, Hous-
ing Markets and Housing Institutions in a Comparative Context, in HOUSING MAR-
KETS, supra, at 1, 8.
4. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949) (current ver-
sion at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994)).
5. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13; Harsman & Quigley,
supra note 3, at 8; J. Paul Mitchell, The Historical Context for Housing Policy, in
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS, PAST & PRESENT 3, 4 (J. Paul Mitchell
ed., 1985); see also E. Jay Howenstine, The New Housing Shortage: The Problem of
Housing Affordability in the United States, in THE NEW HOUSING SHORTAGE 8
(Graham Hallet ed., 1993) (indicating that the gross national product of the Unit-
ed States nearly quadrupled between 1946 and 1989, increasing from $1.1 trillion
to $4.1 trillion); ANN L. STRONG, LAND BANKING: EUROPEAN REALITY, AMERICAN
PROSPECT 45 (1979).
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crises to that in developing countries.'
In 1996, the crisis deepens. Far from improving the inter-
national comparison, the United States maintains an increas-
ingly high level of people living in poverty.! In a comparative
analysis of eight representative countries undertaken by the
U.S. government,8 the United States exhibited a poverty level
double that of other developed countries.9 In yet another
study, international analysts found a 17% poverty rate in the
United States, a rate higher than all other countries represent-
ed, including Canada, West Germany, Israel, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. 0 Sweden and Norway had the low-
est poverty rates at 5%." When the number of children living
in poverty is considered, the United States' poverty level is
three times that of other countries surveyed." The United
States child poverty rate increased between 1979 and 1986,
from 15.6% to 20.4%. In 1991, the number grew to 21.5%,
the highest number of children living in poverty in an eighteen
country study. 4
6. NON-PROFrP HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 1, at 2.
7. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 1451 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinaier OVER-
VIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS].
8. The comparative study included the United States, Canada, Australia,
Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 1453.
9. Id. at 1451. A poverty rate of 13.3% was found for the United States in
1986. Id. at 1453.
10. HENRY MLNER, SWEDEN: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE 201 (1989). The
statistics in this study were compiled in 1986. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also LEE RAINWATER & TIMOTHY M. SMEEDING, DOING POORLY:
THE REAL INCOME OF AMERICAN CHILDREN IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (Lux-
embourg Income Study Working Paper No. 127, 1995) (analyzing income and pov-
erty rates in 14 European countries, Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United
States and finding that in all countries but Israel and Ireland the standards of
living of children living in poverty is at least 30% higher than in the United
States). Analyzed separately, U.S. children living with single parents had a pover-
ty rate of 54.2% (the highest rate of all the nations in the study). OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 1452; see RAINWATER & SMEEDING, su-
pra, at 12.
13. OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 1451; see also
Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577,
577-85 (1989) (providing a detailed analysis of trends in United States child pover-
ty rates during the 1980s).
14. RAINWATER & SMEEDING, supra note 12, at 10 (studying Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Israel, and
the United States).
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A shameful travesty of justice is perpetrated on low in-
come people in the United States. This travesty appears from
the enormous wealth available in the United States and the
vastly unequal distribution of that wealth. The United States
boasts the highest standard of living among high income na-
tions.15 High and middle income children in the United States
are as disproportionately wealthy in the international sphere
as low income children are economically poor." The rich are
richer in comparison to other countries and the poor are poor-
er. While comparable nations address similar inequities with
income transfer programs that reduce poverty by as much as
75%, the U.S. government does little to address the problem
and accomplishes only a 25% reduction in poverty rates." The
United States maintains an alarmingly high poverty rate, both
before and after government transfers. 8
Despite its shamefully high poverty rate, the United
States also distinguishes itself among developed countries by
committing proportionately fewer resources to providing ade-
quate housing for families living in poverty. 9 In the late
1970s, government investment in housing was 18% higher in
the countries of Western Europe than in the United States.0
Analysis of direct government spending on housing bodes even
worse for the United States. The United States holds the dis-
tinction of expending an insignificant share of government
dollars on housing.21 In 1980, the percentage of public expen-
ditures dedicated to housing was 0.6 in the United States.22
For purposes of comparison, the Netherlands spent 7% of its
public expenditures on housing in the same year; the United
Kingdom, 5%; and Sweden, 3.4%.' These comparisons got
worse in the 1980s when the U.S. government vastly dimin-
15. Id. at 7, 9.
16. See id. at 8, 9.
17. Id. at 16, 17.
18. See id. at 18.
19. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 151. In terms of overall
government spending on the public sector, the comparison is also stark. In 1980,
the United States spent 21% of its gross national product on the public sector.
Sweden spent 62%; the Netherlands, 61%; Great Britain, 52%. H~rsman &
Quigley, supra note 3, at 15.
20. Id. This figure relates to "total fixed capital investment."
21. See Hrsman & Quigley, supra note 3, at 13-14.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id.
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ished federal funding for existing affordable housing pro-
grams.
24
It is no surprise that the few federal dollars allocated for
the basic necessity of housing have not measurably impacted
upon the housing crisis. In 1990, approximately 43% of low-
income renters paid more than half of their gross incomes for
rent; more than 30% is considered unaffordable.' Because al-
most two-thirds of low-income renters do not receive any gov-
ernment rent subsidy, many low-income households do not
have additional resources for their housing costs other than
the family budget.26 As a result, families are unable to feed
and clothe themselves properly, and often must choose whether
to pay the rent or buy food.27 Fourteen million households
cannot afford a single penny for housing if they are to meet
their minimum costs for nonshelter basics such as food, medi-
cal care, and clothing.' Thus, many families find themselves
either completely shut out of housing, or with housing costs so
burdensome that basic necessities must be foregone.
The lack of affordable housing in the United States, partic-
ularly for low-income households, is caused by a combination of
two factors: declining household incomes and sharply rising
24. See Marshall M. A. Feldman & Richard L. Florida, Economic Restructaring
and the Changing Role of the State in U.S. Housing, in GOVERNMENT AND HoUs-
ING: DEVELOPMENTS IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 31, 41 (Willem van Vliet & Jan van
Weesep eds., 1990) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING]. Funding for afford-
able housing programs for low income people reached an all-time high of $31.5
billion in 1978. By 1982, the Reagan administration had decimated funding for the
programs leaving $13.3 billion in funding and $9.5 billion by 1987. Id. By 1989,
funding for affordable housing programs fell to $8 billion. See W. Dennis Keating
et al., Community Development Corporations in the United States: Their Role in-
Housing and Urban Development, in GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING, supra, at 206,
206.
25. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE
OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 18 (1995). In some cases, households pay up to 70% of
their income for rent. The State of Our Nation's Housing: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1993) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (statement of Chester Hartman, President and Executive Director, Poverty
and Race Research Action Council). As a general rule, housing is considered unaf-
fordable if it consumes in excess of 30% of gross household income. Michael B.
Gerrard, The Victims of N1MBY?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 506 n.56 (1993).
26. Chester Hartman, A Universal Solution to the Minority Housing Problem,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1993).
27. Hearings, supra note 25, at 14.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 14.
19961
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housing costs.3" In fact, it has been recognized that "what ex-
ists is a fundamental and growing structural gap between
incomes and housing costs."3 For example, from 1970 to 1994,
the median income of renter households decreased by 16% to
$15,184, while gross rents increased by more than 11% to $403
per month.32 Furthermore, beginning in the late 1970s and
continuing through the early 1990s, the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) for housing costs outpaced income.33 The inability of
household income to keep up with escalating housing costs has
spawned the affordable housing crisis in the United States
today.34 Estimates show that in order to close the
"affordability gap" (the gap between housing cost and income)
in the U.S. housing market, $92 billion in funding would be
needed annually. 5
High housing costs, the second key contributor to the af-
fordable housing crisis, can be attributed to a severe shortage
in the nation's housing supply.36 From 1974 to 1994, the num-
30. CUSHING N. DOLBEARE, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, Low
INCOME HOUSING NEEDS 1 (1989) (finding that "[t]he root cause of most housing
problems in [the United States] is the large and growing gap between the cost of
decent housing . . . and the income which is available to pay for it"); Michael A.
Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 1990s: Crises in Affordability and Accountability,
18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545, 550 (1991) (finding that "[a] rise in real rents and a
decline in the median income of renters ... have contributed to a serious tenant
squeeze").
31. Hearings, supra note 25, at 15.
32. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note
25, at 18. This translates into a median gross rental burden of 30.5%, the third
highest rental burden recorded in over two decades. Id. In 1992, the gross rent
burden was at a twenty-five year high at 31%. Hearings, supra note 25, at 7, 14
(statements of Villian C. Apgar, Executive Director, Joint Center for Housing
Studies of Harvard University & Chester Hartman, President and Executive Direc-
tor, Poverty and Race Research Action Council). Given that 43% of low-income
renters paid more than 50% of their incomes for rent in 1990, the rent burdens of
low-income households have been especially severe. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note 25, at 18.
33. Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look
at its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 546 (1995) (citing R. ALLEN HAYS, THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 59 (1985); ALLAN MALLACH,
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 4 (1984)).
34. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 550.
35. MICHAEL E. STONE, ONE-THIRD OF A NATION: A NEW LOOK AT HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY IN AMERICA 2, 15 (1990). The $92 billion figure represents 1987
dollars. The aggregate gap amounts to only a small percentage of America's Gross
National Product. See id. at 15. However, throughout the 1980s, the affordability
gap grew at a rate 20% faster than GNP. Id. at 2.
36. See Padilla, supra note 33, at 544. The rise in housing costs results from
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ber of affordable dwellings has decreased by half in the North-
east. The total stock of affordable rental housing in the South
and West also fell below 1974 levels.' According to the Cen-
ter on Budget and Policy Priorities,38 in 1985 there were 3.7
million fewer low-rent units than low-income renter house-
holds. In 1989, there were 4.1 million fewer low-rent units
than low-income renters.39 The affordable housing stock con-
tinues to erode during the 1990s, leaving low-income renters
with limited housing choices. 0
The shortage in the housing market has resulted from a
combination of several factors.41 First, low-income housing
production has declined substantially over the past decade.42
According to the Congressional Budget Office, net new commit-
ments to provide assisted housing averaged less than 10,000
units between 1988 and 1993, down from between 300,000 and
400,000 units in the late 1970s." Given that cutbacks in fed-
eral housing programs are on the horizon, the production, and
thus the stock of low-cost units will continue to diminish.44
several factors including high demand in light of limited supply. See id. According
to analysts, the United States "has a severe and growing shortage of available
housing!' Gerrard, supra note 25, at 506.
37. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note
25, at 19.
38. John C. Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in
Retrospect - An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1332 n.188 (1993) (citing PAUL
A. LEONARD ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE
POOR 6 (1989)).
39. Id. at 1334 n.194 (citing EDWARD B. LAZARE ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL
HOME: THE Low INcoiE HOUSING CRISIS CONTINUES 5 fig. 1 (Ctr. on Budget &
Policy Priorities ed., 1991)). A "low-rent unit" is defined as a unit renting for un-
der $250 per month. Id.
40. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note
25, at 18, 20.
41. Boger, supra note 38, at 1332-33.
42. Randi L. Engel, Comment, Critical Housing Needs and the Emergency Low
Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987: A Short-Term Solution to a Long-Term
Problem, 40 EMORY L.J. 163, 166 n.21 (1993). The decline in public housing pro-
duction has been attributed to changes in federal housing policy initiated during
the Reagan Administration. "[Clonsistent with the [Reagan/Bush] administration's
favoring of rental assistance over new construction programs, the number of subsi-
dized housing starts per year dropped by more than 88%, from 175,000 [in 1979]
to less than 21,000 [in 19891." Boger, supra note 38, at 1332 n.189 (quoting MI-
CHAEL A. STEGMAN, MORE HOUSING, MORE FAIRLY: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING 26, tbl. 25 (1991)).
43. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note
25, at 20.
44. Id.; see discussion and accompanying notes infra pp. 72-75.
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Moreover, changes in the tax code initiated by the 1986 Tax
Reform Act45 have made investment in rental property less
desirable, adding to the lack of low-rent unit production. 6
Finally, state legislation has further decreased the production
of affordable housing." Some states require voter approval of
low-income housing construction that is publicly financed.
Many fear the loss of property values if these units are built in
their neighborhoods. Therefore, such legislation gives citizens
the ability to block the construction of affordable housing. In
many localities this opportunity is eagerly seized. 8
In addition to the lack of housing unit production, loss of
existing units substantially contributes to the housing
shortage. For example, condominium conversion and increased
gentrification of low-income neighborhoods result in a great
loss of low-income housing units." Owner withdrawal of thou-
sands of low-income units built during the 1970s with federal
subsidies adds to the shortage. ° Finally, the abandonment
and demolition of run-down housing further contributes to this
problem."
As the cost of housing rises due to shortages in housing
and other cost-enhancing factors, and the incomes of renters
decline, the affordable housing crisis becomes increasingly
acute. The impact of the crisis is devastating to low-income
people. For those people who somehow secure housing, the
45. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-154, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
46. See Padilla, supra note 33, at 546 (citing R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 58 (1985)). The Tax Reform Act made signifi-
cant changes in the tax code. The Act eliminated many incentives that once exist-
ed to invest in and operate real property. After the revisions, real estate was not
as lucrative of an investment as it once was. See ARLENE ZAREMBKA, THE URBAN
HOUSING CRISIS 21-22 (1990).
47. Padilla, supra note 33, at 545.
48. See id. In California, for example, the state constitution requires voter
approval of affordable housing that is at least 50% publicly financed. Id. at 545
n.22 (discussing the constitutional challenges to this provision). Florida has a simi-
lar statute which makes it difficult to establish affordable housing. Id. at 545.
49. Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 315, 321-22 (1991); Padilla, supra note 33, at 546.
50. Boger, supra note 38, at 1333-34.
51. See Padilla, supra note 33, at 546. In light of local ordinances and hous-
ing codes, many landlords find it unprofitable to continue operating their units.
This has led to the abandonment of buildings. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., There But
For Fortune-the Homeless: Who They Are and How to Help Them, NEW REPUBLIC,
June 24, 1991, at 27, 30.
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rents are increasingly unaffordable, leaving low-income tenants
without funds for basic human necessities." For people who
cannot secure affordable housing nor continue to pay for unaf-
fordable housing, homelessness results.
In fact, the affordable housing crisis has been recognized
as "play[ing] an essential role" in contributing to the onset of
homelessness in many Americans' lives.5" Unable to secure
any type of housing due to the affordability problem, increas-
ing numbers of families seek homes in shelters or in the
streets. Estimates of the number of homeless individuals in the
United States prove difficult to gather due to the nature of the
problem. Consequently, the numbers vary from a low of be-
tween 192,000 and 350,000' to a high of 1.5 to 3 million.55
However, as many as 600,000 people remain homeless in
America on any given night.56 Approximately seven million
Americans have experienced homelessness at least once in
their lives.5" Families account for 20% of the homeless popula-
tion and 80% of families that are homeless are headed by a
single mother. 5 Children comprise 15% of the homeless popu-
lation.59 While homelessness is a devastating experience at
any age, it has profound effects upon children. Children whose
families cannot afford a home often suffer from malnutrition,
perform poorly in school, and have related mental and emo-
tional problems."
The housing affordability crisis not only creates the prob-
lem of homelessness, but also results in people being "precari-
ously housed."61 People who are precariously housed live on
52. See Hearings, supra note 25, at 14 (statement of Chester Hartman, Presi-
dent and Executive Director, Poverty and Race Research Action Council).
53. Engel, supra note 42, at 166 n.19.
54. OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP' OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND
EMERGENCY SHELTERS 18-19 (1984); see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS 2-3
(1994) (discussing the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Report).
'55. DiIulio, supra note 51, at 28.
56. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON THE HOMELESS, U.S. DEPI'T OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, PRIORITY: HOME! THE FEDERAL PLAN TO BREAK THE CYCLE
OF HOMELESSNESS 17 (1994) [hereinafter PRIORITY: HOME!].
57. Id.
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id. at 21 n.3.
60. See Ellen L. Bassuk, Homeless Families, SCI. AM., Dec. 1991, at 66, 66,
70.
61. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and
1996]
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the brink of homelessness and are soon to "cross the narrow
divide between shelter and the streets."2 An estimated six
million people are precariously housed or "pre-homeless" in the
United States." They are often forced to "double up" with
friends or relatives which causes overcrowding and substan-
dard living conditions.64 Moreover, the situation of being pre-
cariously housed is often chronic, rather than a passing phase
in a family's life. According to one study, "crossing the line
between extreme crisis poverty and homelessness has become
largely a matter of timing-not when, but how often."65
In the current political climate, the crisis will become
predictably worse. It doesn't take an alarmist to realize the af-
fordable housing implications of the budget-slashing, program-
cutting Republican Congress.66 Relying on the private, mar-
ket-driven sector for provision of adequate housing for low
income people has not worked.67 There is no evidence that the
Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994: Hearings on H.R. 2491
Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1994)
[hereinafter Appropriations Hearings] (statement of Thomas L. Kenyon, President,
National Alliance to End Homelessness).
62. Berger, supra note 49, at 321.
63. Appropriations Hearings, supra note 61, at 148 (statement of Thomas L.
Kenyon, President, National Alliance to End Homelessness).
64. PAUL A. LEONARD ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUS-
ING FOR THE POOR 24 (1989). Overcrowding among poor families has been deemed
"rampant." Hartman, supra note 26, at 1559. Overcrowding is "a hazard to health
and a creator of family tensions, and [causes] poor study environments for school-
children ... ." Id.
65. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 56, at 22.
66. See 32 INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMICS, COMMUNITY ECONOMICS 5
(1995); see also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Solutions to the Affordable Housing Crisis:
Perspectives on Privatization, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263, 263 (1995).
67. See Richard P. Appelbaum, Swedish Housing in the Postwar Period: Some
Lessons for American Housing Policy, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 535,
553 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986) (finding that "[t]he marketplace has been
unable to provide adequate shelter for all, and will prove increasingly incapable of
doing so"); Peter Marcuse, United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
OF HOUSING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 327, 368 (William van Vliet ed., 1990) (find-
ing that "[t]he attempt to regulate the private profit-motivated housing sector to
provide housing for those not economically able to pay its market price is unlikely
to succeed"); SCOTt LECKIE, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON HOUSING
RIGHTS: OPTIONS AT HABITAT II 34 (ASIL Issue Papers on World Conferences No.
4, 1994) [hereinafter HABITAT ]. In HABITAT I[, Leckie asserts that:
[a]lthough throughout the international community the embrace of mar-
ket-based solutions to the on-going housing crisis is very much in fashion
at the moment, one would be hard pressed to identify any country pursu-
ing neo-liberal economics where the housing rights of all dwellers have
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private sector will produce affordable housing without govern-
ment support. Solving the housing affordability crisis will only
be possible with significant increases in federal funding.68
Under the current conservative initiatives in Congress,
however, the affordability problem will become worse. Both the
House and the Senate have approved drastic reductions in
spending for the 1996 fiscal year.69 Under pending bills, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs
are set to be reduced by 20%.'o Budget cuts will result in 240
HUD programs receiving absolutely no funding in fiscal year
1996.1 Congress will also reduce public housing construction
been ensured in either law or in fact. A new housing rights convention
would serve, therefore, to underline the fact that housing rights
entitlements (and indeed all human rights) transcend prevailing economic
ideologies and that notwithstanding economic policies drawing heavily
upon the market to satisfy basic human requirements, the right to a safe
and secure place in which to live in peace and dignity is of clear univer-
sal relevance.
Id.; see also W. Dennis Keating et al., Community Development Corporations in the
United States: Their Role in Housing and Urban Redevelopment, in GOVERNMENT
AND HOUSING, supra note 24, at 206, 207; Salsich, supra note 66, at 288-89; Peter
Ambrose, The Performance of National Housing Systems-A Three-Nation Compari-
son, 7 HOUSING STUD. 163, 165-66 (1992); Lyle C. Fitch & Ruth P. Mack, Land
Banking, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA: PLANNING OUR LAND USE 134, 144 (C.
Lowell Harris ed., 1974) [hereinafter THE GOOD EARTH].
68. While funding is needed to remedy the problem of housing affordability,
funding is likewise needed to remedy another aspect of America's housing crisis:
rehabilitation of existing public housing units. It is estimated that $9 billion is
needed to repair the nation's public housing. ZAREMBKA, supra note 46, at 4 (citing
DAVID C. SCHWARTZ ET AL., A NEW HOUSING POLICY FOR AMERICA 122 (1988)).
Furthermore, public housing has a backlog of modernization needs in excess of $25
billion. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1995)
(testimony of Gregory Byrne, Executive Director, Dade County Department of
Housing and Urban Development). Modernization funds in the amount of $4 billion
would be needed just to keep up with the backlog and to eliminate it within a de-
cade. Id. In the meantime, many of the nation's 1.3 million families living in pub-
lic housing experience "unimaginable and . .. intolerable living conditions" NATL
COMM. ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUSING, FINAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
AND SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2 (1992).
69. See David Phinney, Funding Cuts Tighten Squeeze on San Francisco
Homeless, Clinton Administration Claims, States News Service, Oct. 3, 1995, avail-
able in LEXS, News Library, CURNWS File.
70. See Democrats Urge a Veto: Senate Approves Cuts for VA, HUD, EPA,
News & Observer (Raleigh), Sept. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NEWS File.
71. Senate Approves HUD Appropriations Bill; Fair Housing Act Initiatives
Curtailed, BNA's Banking Report, Oct. 2, 1995, at 529, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
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funds by $1.6 billion, further contributing to the shortage of
affordable housing for low-income families.72
Reductions in housing programs, coupled with spending
cuts in welfare and medicaid, are predicted to be "disastrous"
in fighting homelessness."3 Additionally, while direct spending
on programs to assist people who are homeless amounted to
$1.12 billion in 1995, spending will only be between $676 mil-
lion and $760 million in fiscal year 1996."4 Paradoxically, the
spending cuts proposed by Congress are accompanied by a
$250 billion tax cut for wealthy Americans. 5 Congress is also
proposing to appropriate to the Pentagon $7 billion more than
requested.7" Furthermore, while the proposed spending bills
cut homelessness assistance programs, public housing con-
struction and other IHUD programs, funding for the space sta-
tion is kept intact.77
Advocates for affordable housing for low income people
must become visionaries. A long range vision must peer
through the mounting gloom, and see a time when the U.S.
government will realize the social and political injustice perpe-
trated against its people for decades. It is hard to predict what
it will take for the government to realize the true problem of
poverty and begin to provide real solutions to the problem.
Perhaps it will take the kind of intense social unrest, protest,
and urban riots which escalated in the 1960s.78 Perhaps the
72. See Democrats Urge a Veto: Senate Approves Cuts for VA, HUD, EPA,
supra note 70. Congress has also proposed to grant public housing authorities
"more power to demolish old units, raise rents, and admit wealthier tenants."
James W. Brosnan, GOP Rewrites Public Housing Rules, Stirring Debate, Com.
Appeal (Memphis), Oct. 2, 1995, at LA, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File. Furthermore, the Republican Congress is looking to reduce the
earned-income tax credit in order to increase taxes on 14.4 million low-income
workers. See Henry G. Cisneros, Cities: The Death of a Thousand Cuts; The Devas-
tating Changes Sought by the GOP Congress, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 5, 1995, at A19.
73. See Phinney, supra note 69 (quoting Eugene Lowe, Assistant Director, U.S.
Conference of Mayors).
74. Id. According to one commentator, "it is pretty apparent ... that the sum
in total cuts will put more people on the streets." Id. (quoting Eugene Lowe, As-
sistant Director, U.S. Conference of Mayors).
75. William A. Weathers, Cisneros: Change is Due in '96, CINCINNATI ENQUIRo
ER, Sept. 29, 1995, at A14.
76. Id.
77. Sam Walker, Your Road Map to Congress's Budget Bills, CHRISTIAN SCL
MONIToR, Oct. 3, 1995, at 1, 8.
78. Feldman & Florida, supra note 24, at 44; see also Marcuse, supra note 67,
at 367 (postulating that the government's deliberate campaign to divide and con.
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United States government will finally succumb to the interna-
tional embarrassment of being viewed as a greedy and selfish
nation. Perhaps it will take a combination of both eventuali-
ties. Whatever form the wake-up call takes, it will be loud and
clear. The way a country treats all of its people becomes a
reflection of its humanity. It remains inhumane to ignore an
entire segment of the population which does not have the
means to survive on a daily basis. The inhumanity becomes
cruelty when people who have nothing are ignored so that
people who have enough can get more.79
Bridging the chasm between the haves and the have-nots
requires a commitment to housing equity. Adequate housing
becomes the basis from which people build lives, the stability
which underlies a quality education, and an effective job
search."0 Housing equity provides everyone with an opportu-
nity for a stable and secure home environment from which to
meet the challenges of everyday, productive lives.
III. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY AND
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
When the United States truly dedicates itself to providing
a decent home and suitable living environment for all its in-
habitants, the goal can be achieved. It is not too late to develop
and fund a cohesive and comprehensive national housing policy
which will realistically provide adequate housing for all the
people in the United States. When our nation decides to take
affordable housing seriously, illustrations of national housing
policies from other countries can be emulated and adapted.8'
Although no country can claim 100% success in affordable
housing provision, a handful have made incredible progress
towards that goal."
quer the classes keeps people living in poverty powerless).
79. See NON-PROFIT HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 1, at 67-68; see also
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80. See HOUSING MARKETS, supra note 3, at 2-3; PETER DICKENS ET AL.,
HOUSING, STATES AND LOCALITIES 11-12 (1985); see generally HABITAT II, supra
note 67, at 6-8.
81. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13.
82. See id; G6sta Esping-Andersen & Walter Korpi, From Poor Relief to In-
stitutional Welfare States: The Development of Scandinavian Social Policy, in THE
SCANDINAVIAN MODEL: WELFARE STATES AND WELFARE RESEAROH 39, 63-73 (Robert
Erikson et al. eds., 1987).
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While these success stories are few and far between, they
can help keep the vision of equitable and affordable housing
alive in the United States. The Scandinavian countries have
made the most progress worldwide towards the elimination of
poverty and the provision of decent housing for their people.
All of the Scandinavian countries have kept child poverty rates
below 5%, while at the same time, high income Swedish and
Danish families can claim a degree of wealth comparable to
American families.83 Furthermore, Sweden and Denmark
have reduced the poverty rate in their countries by 75%
through their tax and transfer programs." Although differ-
ences in the political, social, and economic contexts exist, both
among the Scandinavian countries themselves and between
them and the United States, lessons from their experiences can
still be applied to the United States.5 The fact remains that
other nations have produced results in fighting poverty and
providing affordable housing to low income people far greater
in scope and effect than has the United States.86
A study of Sweden illustrates the best example of how a
country can provide quality living conditions to all of its peo-
ple, despite economic status. Deemed a "welfare state,""' Swe-
den certainly takes the welfare of its people seriously.' Sim-
ply stated, there are three main elements of the welfare state:
First, social policy is comprehensive in its attempt to provide
welfare .... The principles of the welfare state are, in other
words, pushed further into civil society than is international-
ly common .... The second distinct feature is the degree to
83. See RAINWATER & SMEEDING, supra note 12, at 8, 11.
84. Id. at 14.
85. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13, 150; Appelbaum,
supra note 67, at 554.
86. See RAINWATER & SMEEDING, supra note 12, at 22.
87. See SVEN E. OLSSON, SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE STATE IN SWEDEN 245
(1990) (defining the welfare state as "a state which assumes responsibility for
citizen welfare in the context of a market economy and a plural polity . . . ").
88. It is interesting to note that the welfare states extend their concern for
people beyond their own national boundaries. Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands,
and Norway are the only developed countries which meet or exceed the United
Nations' recommended goal of allocating 0.7% of gross national product for foreign
aid to developing countries. The Social Summit: Worlds Apart, ECONOMIST, Mar.
11, 1995 at 42, 45. The United States allocates a mere 0.015% of its gross nation-
al product to foreign aid. Mary Williams Walsh, Danes, Unlike Most in U.S., Favor
Their Foreign Aid, LA. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at A8, A9. Denmark, the leader in
regard to foreign aid, commits 1.02% of its gross national product. Id.
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which the social entitlement principle has been institutional-
ized. The [welfare state] ha[s] vested citizens with a basic
right to a very broad range of services and benefits which, as
a whole, is intended to constitute a democratic right to a so-
cially adequate level of living. The third feature is the
solidaristic and universalist nature of social legislation. The
welfare state is meant to integrate and include the entire
population rather than target its resources toward particular
problem groups. Social policy is actively employed in the
pursuit of a more egalitarian society."
In the United States, the term "welfare" and people who
receive "welfare" are perceived negatively. By contrast, in Swe-
den the welfare state is perceived as benevolent and provides a
decent standard of living for all people," the highest standard
of living in the world for some." Unlike the United States,
where funding for welfare programs gets eliminated so middle
and high income people can receive tax cuts, the people of
Sweden endorse tax and transfer programs to enable the gov-
ernment to bridge the gap between people who have more and
those who have less.92 The collective social rewards of signifi-
cant individual monetary contributions counterbalance the
expense. The people in Sweden enjoy direct benefits from their
taxes. Crime rates and levels of substance abuse are remark-
ably lower in Sweden than in other countries.93
Sweden's accomplishments in seeing to the welfare of all
its people are particularly significant to the United States.
Sweden combines its socialist approach to redistributive wel-
fare with a capitalist approach to the private market.94
89. Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 42-43.
90. See id. at 40. Swedish housing policy acknowledges that "[tihe whole popu-
lation should be provided with sound, spacious, well planned and appropriately
equipped dwellings of good quality at a reasonable cost." CHESTER C. MCGUIRE,
INTERNATIONAL HOUSING POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 187 (1981) (quoting
the Swedish Constitution, the Riksdag).
91. See Joanne Barkan, Sweden: Not Yet Paradise, But.... , DISSENT, Spring
1989, at 147, 148; Richard Reeves, The Palme Obsession: The Murder Sweden
Can't Forget-Or Solve, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 20, 56.
92. See MILNER, supra note 10, at 188, 212.
93. See id. at 206 (finding that reported violent or serious crimes were 21 per
100,000 in Sweden versus 250 per 100,000 in the United States) (citing GOSTA
REHN & K. HELVEG PETERSEN, EDUCATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN SWEDEN
AND DENMARK 41 (1980)).
94. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13.
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Sweden's brand of Social Democracy demonstrates the
government's ability to "pursue a socialist policy without doing
away with private ownership of the means of production." 5
"Sweden, it should be noted, can be taken as the exemplar of
social democratic capitalism.96
The remainder of this article examines how Sweden has
succeeded in providing decent, affordable housing to all of its
people. The article examines Sweden's land use policies, legal
structures for ownership, and the political contexts in which
housing equity in Sweden arose. It then analyzes how the
Swedish system could be applied to the United States.
IV. AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND LAW IN SWEDEN
Sweden bears the banner as the international leader of
affordable housing policy success. Upheld by many as the pre-
mier example of a country successfully meeting the housing
needs of its people, Sweden has been described as "a 'success
story' without parallel anywhere in the world," 7 having a
"vanguard role in housing policy,"8 having "aroused interna-
tional attention,"9 and having "gone far to assure that all its
residents are decently housed." °0
The Swedish Constitution guarantees decent housing to all
citizens.'0 ' The lofty goal of a right to housing, however, be-
comes dependent on political decisions regarding allocation of
resources.' To understand the Swedish affordable housing
success story, one must gain an understanding of the historical
and political contexts in which the accomplishments were
achieved. After the historical and political overview, this sec-
tion will provide an analysis of the specific policies and pro-
grams developed by Sweden to realize quality housing for all.
95. Lennart J. Lundqvist et al., Housing Policy in Sweden-Still a Success
Story?, 14 INTL J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 445, 445 (1990).
96. DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 3.
97. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 445.
98. Jim Kemeny, The Significance of Swedish Rental Policy: Cost Renting:
Command Economy Versus the Social Market in Comparative Perspective, 8 HOUS-
ING STUD. 3, 4 (1993).
99. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 445.
100. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13.
101. See MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 187; see also Lars Nord, National Hous.
ing Policy and Local Politics in Sweden, in GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING, supra note
24, at 67, 67; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 446.
102. See Nord, supra note 101, at 69; H-Arsman & Quigley, supra note 3, at 8.
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A. Historical and Political Contexts
The fourth largest country in Europe, °3 Sweden's land
mass covers an area of 173,732 square miles.0 4 It has an es-
timated population of 8,486,000 people, and an overall popula-
tion density of forty-nine people per square mile, although 84%
of the people live in urban areas. While there are minority
groups, Sweden has a homogenous population which is pre-
dominantly Caucasian. Sweden's Gross Domestic Product per
capita is $20,245 and its Gross National Product is
$228,599,500,000. Sweden has a constitutional monarchy and a
parliamentary form of government.'
As most countries, including the United States, Sweden
did not pay significant attention to affordable housing concerns
until the mid to late 1940s.' 7 In fact, prior to World War II,
Sweden held the dubious distinction of having some of the
worst housing conditions in any industrial society.' 8 After a
moratorium on housing construction during World War II,09
the Royal Commission on Housing and Redevelopment called
for a comprehensive national housing policy."0 The report
issued by the Royal Commission in 1945 set out specific goals,
including an end to the housing shortage problem, increased
dwelling space and liveability, lower rents, more public hous-
ing, local control of housing efforts, and disassociation of hous-
ing from market forces."' With this report, the Social Demo-
cratic Party, having been in power since 1932, finally put its
indelible mark on Swedish national housing policy."' As it
had already done with social security programs and labor poli-
cies, the Social Democratic government assumed a decisive and
103. Tyler Marshall, Sweden Uneasy Over Failure to Solve Palme's Assassina-
tion, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1987, at 6.
104. KCWDlKaleidoscope, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WORLD File [hereinafter Kaleidoscope].
105. Id.
106. Id. (1990-91 figures).
107. See Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 63.
108. See DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 49; GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM,
supra note 3, at 165; Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 537; Ambrose, supra note 67,
at 171.
109. Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 63.
110. Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 537.
111. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 448.
112. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 167.
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regulatory role in the nation's housing.113 The housing policy,
based on a "socialist market" approach, became the cornerstone
of Swedish housing programs for the next thirty years."' The
cost of housing would be removed from the speculative market
and replaced by socialized risk."5
In retrospect, it becomes clear that the institutionalization
of the Social Democratic housing policy was possible due to the
Party's control of Swedish government for all but nine of the
past years since 1932.16 Although initially criticized by the
Liberals and Conservatives for legislating overreaching welfare
programs during a time of relative prosperity after the
war,"7 the Social Democratic Party maintained a stronghold
on government necessary to carry out its intended policies."'
The government was able to turn talk into action and establish
comprehensive housing welfare programs from 1946 until
1976.1'9
The initial goal of Swedish housing policy was alleviation
of the extreme housing shortage. 21 The large-scale produc-
tion of housing which was needed could only be accomplished
by removing housing distribution from the profit-making vaga-
ries of the capitalist market. Creating a socialist housing mar-
ket involved curtailing speculation on the cost of land and on
the cost of housing on the land.' In 1947, legislation gave
municipalities the right to expropriate land and to control land
sales by a first right of refusal." Municipal land banking
provided a generous source of affordable land upon which to
build nonmarket housing." Also in 1947, the Building Act
legislated municipal control over the location and density of
113. See Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 63-64.
114. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 165; Appelbaum, supra
note 67, at 537; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 445.
115. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 165.
116. The Left Consolidates: Scandinavia, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1994, at 51.
117. See Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 51.
118. This stronghold was possible at times due to the Social Democratic Party's
ability to form coalition governments with other parties. See GILDERBLOOM &
APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 167; The Nordic Countries: Heading South, ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 5, 1994, Survey, at 4.
119. See DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 37; Ambrose, supra note 67, at 171.
120. See Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 64.
121. Ambrose, supra note 67, at 169.
122. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 168.
123. See Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 544; DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at
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development. 12 4
Fueled by national government subsidies and municipal
planning, housing development charged ahead. The capitalist
system of housing production continued with private enterprise
constructing housing. Social democratic principles governed
distribution with nonmarket principles dominating the sale
and leasing of housing." With cost controls and nonprofit
markets in place, the national government committed signifi-
cant financial resources to housing production, mostly in the
form of below-market, fixed-rate loans.'26 More than 90% of
all housing built in Sweden since World War II has been fund-
ed by state loan subsidies.'
The combination of government loans and municipal con-
trol of land and development proved a successful formula for
curtailing the housing shortage. By the 1960s, Sweden boasted
the highest rate of housing development in the world.'" In
1965, Sweden launched its 'Million Dwellings Programme,'
2 9
ambitiously planning to build one million dwellings within ten
years.'30 The goal was truly remarkable considering the pop-
ulation of Sweden at the time was 7.5 million people.13" ' How-
ever, it was not considered enough merely to create dwellings.
Those dwellings had to constitute decent, quality housing.'32
Equally as important, they had to be affordable."
While the similar intent expressed in the United States
124. See Alex Anas et al., The Swedish Housing Market: Development & Institu-
tional Setting, in HOUSING MARKETS, supra note 3, at 31, 34.
125. See Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 445-46; Appelbaum, supra note 67,
at 536; GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13.
126. DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 37; Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 545;
Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 64.
127. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 446; see MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at
193-95.
128. See MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 187.
129. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 448; see MILNER, supra note 10, at
197.
130. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 164; OLSSON, supra note 87,
at 268; Joachim Vogel, Urban Segregation in Sweden: Housing Policy, Housing
Markets, and the Spacial Distribution of Households in Metropolitan Areas, 27 SOC.
INDICATORS RES. 139, 141 (1992).
131. HuGo HECLO & HENRIK MADSEN, POLICY AND POLITIcS IN SWEDEN 214
(1987).
132. See id. at 210.
133. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 164.
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Housing Act of 1949 still remains but a dream,"' Sweden
happily achieved its stated target."' By 1975, Sweden gloried
in one of the highest ratios of dwellings to inhabitants in the
world, at a comfortable 430 dwellings for every 1,000 peo-
ple."'36 Within its specified ten-year time frame, Sweden
reached its aspirations of ending the housing shortage, improv-
ing housing conditions, and bringing housing into the realm of
affordability.3 7 Gone were the days of overcrowded, un-
healthy conditions for Sweden's residents." Housing stan-
dards now included realistic occupancy limits, adequate sanita-
tion and plumbing, central heating, and modem utilities.3 '
Sweden's housing supply, in addition to being in good condi-
tion, became affordable to people. A national system of housing
allowances guaranteed that a person's contribution to rent
would be no more than 25% of their income."
By the mid-1970s, Sweden had declared its housing prob-
lems solved.' In terms of actual numbers, this proclamation
certainly was truthful. In terms of fairness in the distribution
of housing, including individual choice of tenure and economic
equality in access to different tenures, Sweden still had signifi-
cant work ahead.' During the million dwellings program,
construction consisted mainly of public and cooperative hous-
ing,14 which constituted 38% of the housing supply by
134. See STRONG, supra note 5, at 45.
135. Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 536; Vogel, supra note 130, at 141. In fact,
Sweden exceeded its goal of one million units of housing by constructing a total of
1,005,600 dwellings. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 170.
136. MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 190.
137. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 461 (Sweden "had achieved the goal of
providing 'the whole population with sound, spacious, well planned and appropri-
ately equipped dwellings of good quality at reasonable costs'"); MCGUIRE, supra
note 90, at 187; Sten-Ake Stenberg, Evictions in the Welfare State-An Unintended
Consequence of the Swedish Policy?, 34 AC'rA SOCIOLOGICA 103, 103 (1991); DICK-
ENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 48-49.
138. See Vogel, supra note 130, at 139.
139. OLSSON, supra note 87, at 268.
140. Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 536; GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra
note 3, at 164; see also HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 210.
141. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 175; see DICKENS ET AL.,
supra note 80, at 49.
142. See HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 208; Lundqvist et al., supra
note 95, at 449.
143. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 164; Appelbaum, supra note
67, at 536; Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 68.
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1974."4 The policy objectives expressed in the Housing Act of
1974 reflected an increased need for single family homes, larg-
er apartments in multi-family dwellings, and the availability of
both as rentals and cooperatives.'45 Having more choices in
types of housing would be meaningless, however, without
greater fairness in economic and social benefits among choices.
To accomplish this additional objective, financial incentives
needed to be distributed in a more equitable manner among
tenures. Further, the opportunity for self-determination
brought about by tenant management and control of rental
housing had to occur.'46
Having solved the housing shortage, Sweden's attention
turned toward housing equity, stressing the importance of
economic and social integration of classes in different types of
housing tenures."' From the start of Sweden's determined
housing effort, the ideal of distributive equity in housing was
the motivation behind protecting housing distribution from
market forces.' It would be achieved by increasing the sup-
ply and affordability of single family homes and larger apart-
ments in multi-family dwellings.' Equalizing costs between
rental and ownership posed a challenging task since homeown-
ers enjoyed great tax benefits.'50 Reducing the tax advantag-
es of homeownership was not an option, so increasing the fi-
nancial benefits for other tenures became the goal.'5 ' The
housing allowance program expanded to meet the needs of
distributive equity.'52
The plan worked. Availability of single family homes with
different forms of tenure increased, and equalization of costs
became a reality.'53 Within a decade after 1975, rental and
cooperative tenures in single family homes rose from 4% to
32%.'" Total subsidies for homeownership tripled by
144. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 446.
145. See id. at 449.
146. See id.
147. See Ambrose, supra note 67, at 171-72; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at
448-49.
148. See Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 448.
149. See id. at 456.
150. See 1d. at 450 (citing HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 82).
151. See id.
152. See Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra note 82, at 68.
153. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 172.
154. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 454.
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1981.' There were costs, however. The amount of taxes fore-
gone by government due to homeowners' deductions of mort-
gage interest from income tax more than quadrupled. In fact,
homeowners with the highest incomes enjoyed the greatest
financial benefits from the subsidy programs.156 Conversely,
housing allowances which subsidized costs for mostly low-in-
come families slowed in growth after 1975.157 In 1980, of the
total housing subsidies allocated, 63% (including tax deduc-
tions) were for homeowners, 8% of the subsidies were for coop-
erative dwellers, and 28% went to renters.15 In terms of per-
centage of people in each tenure who received a housing subsi-
dy, the breakdown was 26% of homeowners, 33% of cooperative
dwellers, and 42% of renters.'59
Unbeknownst to the Social Democratic Party, its develop-
ing success in providing all people with a choice of housing ten-
ure would be its temporary undoing.6 ' Despite attempts to
equalize the attractiveness of the three main housing options,
single family and cooperative ownership became overwhelm-
ingly popular.'6' Having achieved homeownership and per-
ceived independence, many people's adherence to the dictates
of social democracy lessened and they grew more conservative.
The Social Democratic power base became weakest among
homeowners.
16 2
Unhappily for the Social Democrats, the Swedish
population's burgeoning move toward ownership occurred in
lockstep with an economic slowdown, which was felt interna-
tionally. The oil crisis of 1973 and other externalities precip-
itated an economic downturn in Sweden that would be felt for
decades. 6 3 The initial consequence of this combination of
155. See id. at 458.
156. Id.; see OLSSON, supra note 87, at 268; Esping-Andersen & Korpi, supra
note 82, at 68.
157. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 458; see OLSSON, supra note 87, at
268.
158. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 450.
159. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 172.
160. See id. at 177.
161. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 178; see OLSSON, supra note
87, at 268; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 446; Appelbaum, supra note 67, at
549.
162. HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 247.
163. The Nordic Countries: A Case Study in Collapse, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994,
Survey, at 6 [hereinafter Nordic Countries]; HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at
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forces was the election of a nonsocialist government in
1976."6 By 1979, the Conservative Party would boast 20% of
the vote.165
The nonsocialist coalition government that maintained
power from 1976 until 1982 set about trying to stem the tide of
the international recession with domestic spending cuts in
social welfare programs. Predictably, the Conservatives also
advanced a return to market pricing in housing.166 These po-
litically unpopular measures did little to counteract the inter-
national forces continuing to stagnate the Swedish econo-
my.'67 With the budget deficit and the national debt growing,
the Social Democratic Party regained political dominance in
1982.168
The Social Democrats' budget-tightening proposals includ-
ed curtailing any financial expansion of social reforms while
avoiding cuts in existing welfare programs,'69 encouraging
investment through consumption disincentives, 70 and trans-
ferring some fiscal responsibility to local governments. De-
spite the implementation of required belt-tightening measures,
the Social Democrats steadfastly reaffirmed their commitment
to quality, affordable housing for all. A ten-year housing pro-
gram was approved in 1983 which reinforced all Swedes' right
to decent housing.7 2 The Social Democrats' response to the
economic crisis proved effective. The industrial sector exhibited
the fastest growth in Europe between 1982 and 1984, and
unemployment remained below 3%.173
The economic glow of the Social Democratic Party was
unexpectedly overshadowed by the assassination of Prime
62.
164. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUm, supra note 3, at 177; Esping-Andersen &
Korpi, supra note 82, at 33.
165. HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 63.
166. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM A, supra note 3, at 177.
167. HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 65.
168. HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 72; OLSSON, supra note 87, at 274.
169. See HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 72-73. Although costs of social
welfare programs have not increased since 1980, neither have they declined.
OLSSON, supra note 87, at 255.
170. See HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 72.
171. OLsSON, supra note 87, at 274.
172. See Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 458.
173. Steven Kelman, Swedish Socialism Revised, NEW LEADER, June 16, 1986,
at 6, 7.
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Minister Olaf Palme on February 28, 1986.' Shaking na-
tional security and the historical safety of Sweden to its core,
the murder of the Prime Minister was never solved. Ingvar
Carlsson became Prime Minister during an emotionally devas-
tating yet economically productive time.7 '
Advantaged by the luck of an improving international
economy, the Social Democrats could take credit for the dimin-
ishing economic crisis without having sacrificed social pro-
grams.76 As they took credit for the good times, so would
they take the blame for not protecting Sweden from the world-
wide recession in 1990. The budget deficit could not be con-
trolled in the face of a hard-hitting industrial production drop
and a resultant rise in unemployment. 77 Once again reacting
to bad economic forecasts by wondering where the grass was
greener, the Swedish citizenry elected a conservative-led gov-
ernment in 1991. The Conservatives, with Carl Bildt as Prime
Minister, let the market take over and tolerated unemploy-
ment as part of a market economy.'78 Hoping to revitalize the
private sector, they cut taxes, deregulated business, and pri-
vatized services.'79 Turning their attention to reducing the
budget deficit, the Conservatives began to dismantle time-hon-
ored social service programs, cutting programs and instituting
market-driven voucher systems for remaining services.80
Despite what the Conservatives perceived to be effective
measures, Sweden's economic woes worsened due to a combina-
tion of domestic miscalculations and external factors, including
174. See James Yuenger, Palme, 'Man of Peace,' Laid to Rest, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
16, 1986, at 3.
175. See id.
176. See HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 74. The infrastructure (housing,
schools, hospitals, etc.) created since the 1950s provided a solid foundation which
stabilized Sweden during shaky economic times. "These conditions made it possible
to limit the belt-tightening brought on by the recession, so that there was no
appreciable retreat on egalitarian policies and services." MILNER, supra note 10, at
188.
177. See Nordic Countries, supra note 163, at 6.
178. Sweden Strides Towards a Market Economy, EURoMONEY, June 1993,
Supp., at 1.
179. See Paula Dwyer & Ariane Sains, Sweden May Welcome Back the Welfare
State, Bus. WK. INT'L ED., Sept. 19, 1994, at 22.
180. See Casten von Otter & Karin Tengvald, A Revolution in Social Welfare?,
13 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 535 (1992); Farewell, Welfare: Nordic Countries,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 67, 68; Dwyer & Sains, supra note 179, at 22.
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problems with the European exchange rate.8' The economy
shrank, the deficit grew, unemployment skyrocketed to levels
uncomfortable even to market-based capitalists, and the na-
tional debt ballooned.'82 The electoral pendulum swung back
to the security of the Social Democratic Party, which won an
unprecedented 45.3% of the vote in September 1994."8
The recent elections seem to show that the Swedish people
prefer higher taxes to social inequity and insecurity.8 4 Hav-
ing proposed an austerity budget during the campaign," 5 the
Social Democrats must now reduce the huge budget deficit.
86
In addition to cuts in social welfare programs, cuts will be felt
in defense, transportation, foreign aid, and the royal house-
hold. ' 7 While reducing spending, Sweden plans to raise taxes
on the highest-paid wage earners and increase the capital
gains tax."s It is hoped that the integrity of the welfare state
can be maintained while the budget deficit is more than halved
by 1998.89
Although such things are hard to predict, prospects look
favorable for Sweden's economy,9 ' the continued stability of
the welfare state, and the continued integrity of Sweden's
affordable housing programs. The Social Democrats retained
political dominance in Sweden for all but nine of 62 years, pri-
marily because of the Swedish people's commitment to caring
and social cohesion. 9' This cohesion remains, despite hard
times for the country and an economic test of the welfare
state's will.
One might speculate that Sweden's system of housing
181. See Nordic Countries, supra note 163, at 6.
182. Dwyer & Sains, supra note 174, at 22.
183. The Left Consolidates: Scandinavia, supra note 116, at 51.
184. Fred Barbash, Swedish Voters Reject Conservative Coalition, WASH. POST,
Sept. 19, 1994, at A15.
185. Nicholas George, Swedish Budget Signals End to Welfare State Expansion,
TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, TIMES file.
186. The Left Consolidates: Scandinavia, supra note 116, at 51; see also Too
Many Bonds?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1994, at 86 (placing Sweden's budget deficit
at 13% of Gross Domestic Product, "easily Europe's biggest").
187. George, supra note 185.
188. 'I am Sticking with the Welfare State', Bus. WK. INT'L ED., Feb. 27, 1995,
at 52.
189. Judgment Day: Sweden, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 49.
190. Indicators point to an economic recovery. See The Left Consolidates: Scan-
dinavia, supra note 116, at 51.
191. See id.
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production, distribution, and tenure will remain because it
works. It achieves the goal of providing quality housing for all.
Even for people who have always been or who grow comfort-
able, the advantages of everyone living in a well-housed coun-
try take precedence over any one individual's getting even
more comfortable at the expense of others. With this optimistic
yet realistic view, a detailed examination of Sweden's housing
programs is necessary in order to draw lessons from the suc-
cessful experience. This detailed analysis begins with the spe-
cifics of the government's role in affordable housing develop-
ment and distribution. It will then turn to the details of the
different forms of housing tenure and their distribution.
B. The Government's Role
1. Division of Responsibility
The governmental division of labor for affordable housing
in Sweden proves extremely efficient. The national government
legislates and administers housing policy while regional and
local governments implement it.'92 In addition to formulating
housing policy, the national government provides the funds for
affordable housing production and distribution.19 At the na-
tional level, the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning
administers and coordinates the allocation of funds among re-
gions.' There are 24 designated counties with regional gov-
ernmental entities called County Administrative Boards. The
County Boards act as intermediaries between the National
Housing Board and municipal governments, overseeing the
municipal housing plans.' This dominance of regional con-
trol proves vastly superior in efficiency, fairness, and effective
resource allocation than the city/suburb competition in the
United States.
In 1947, national legislation granted municipalities power
over the planning, production, and development of housing.
With that power came the responsibility to provide adequate
and affordable housing for the populations within their juris-
192. See MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 188-89; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95,
at 451.
193. See MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 188; Nord, supra note 101, at 67.
194. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 32; MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 188.
195. Aras et al., supra note 124, at 32.
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dictions.96 To accomplish these objectives, municipalities
were empowered to acquire land, by expropriation if necessary,
and to regulate the construction and development of housing
on that land.'97 They were also given considerable tax-raising
authority.'98 Having broad land use planning control, local
governments can lease public land for development, sell it with
restrictions, or use public land for development of nonprofit
housing.'99 To facilitate the latter option, municipal govern-
ments have created municipal housing corporations which
develop and manage decent, affordable housing."' The mu-
nicipalities maintain ownership of the self-sustaining, nonprof-
it housing.''
In the Planning and Building Act of 1987, the municipal
land use planning powers were expanded and updated. Unlike
the United States, where development planning remains prac-
tically nonexistent, the 1987 legislation directed each munici-
pality to form a building committee which creates a compre-
hensive master plan for development of land and buildings.
Although housing built under the master plan is funded
through the state housing loan program, the master plan does
not need national government approval. It does, however, go
through an extensive local public review process. The building
committee has the final discretion to accept or reject sugges-
tions and objections.02 Once accepted, the master plan must
be adhered to by a developer in order for the developer (private
or nonprofit) to receive a state housing subsidy. The developer
must also be building on publicly owned land to qualify for a
state loan.03
196. See id. at 34; GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUrM, supra note 3, at 168-69.
197. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 173; Anas et al., supra note
124, at 35-36.
198. See OLSSON, supra note 87, at 273.
199. Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 544; Anas et al., supra note 124, at 35.
200. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 33; see Lennart J. Lundqvist, Strategies for
the Swedish Public Housing Sector, 6 URB. L. & POLY 215, 235 (1984).
201. Stenberg, supra note 137, at 103.
202. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 34-35; see Lundqvist et al., supra note 95,
at 451.
203. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 48.
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2. Government Spending
The national and municipal governments of Sweden fund
affordable housing through three different systems. Sweden
has an extensive system of land banking which preserves un-
developed, affordable land for development purposes. The ini-
tial outlay of government dollars is spent on land purchases.
Next, the government funds affordable housing by providing
construction loans. Finally, the national and local governments
bankroll housing subsidy programs to make the cost of housing
affordable to all individuals and families.
The success of Sweden's national housing policy has been
built on the foresight of its land banking program. At the turn
of the century, Sweden was already buying undeveloped land
with the intent of preserving it for future affordable housing
development." 4 In and around the city of Stockholm, a most
noteworthy example of land banking, the goal of controlling
future development prompted the conservative government to
buy up farmland surrounding the city.2"' Continuation of this
practice enabled the municipal government to acquire land
very inexpensively during the depression of the 1930s.206 By
1972, the city of Stockholm owned 36% of city land and over
80% of the surrounding land.2"7 Throughout Sweden, the de-
sign and planning of Stockholm has been duplicated. The be-
ginning of the 1970s saw 75% of all new building in Sweden
occurring on municipally-owned land.20 8
Over the years, legislation was enacted to strengthen
municipalities' capabilities to buy, sell, and lease land. The
Housing Provision and Building Acts of 1947 legitimized land
banking by entrusting municipalities with the right of expro-
priation and the right of first refusal on land for sale.20 9 Ex-
propriation rights were strengthened in 1966, and again in
204. See Jack Carr & Lawrence B. Smith, Public Land Banking and the Price
of Land, in PUBLIC PROPERTY? THE HABITAT DEBATE CONTINUED 119, 138 (Law-
rence B. Smith & Michael Walker eds., 1977); Note, Public Land Banking: A New
Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897, 908 (1972) [hereinafter
New Praxis for Urban Growth].
205. Fitch & Mack, supra note 67, at 137.
206. See DICKENs ET AL., supra note 80.
207. William B. Stoebuck, Suburban Land Banking, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 581,
586; see New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 909.
208. Carr & Smith, supra note 204, at 138.
209. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 168.
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1971. Moreover, in 1968 the price municipalities paid for ex-
propriated land was reduced to the land's value ten years prior
to sale.21° In 1973, municipalities were given the right to ex-
propriate substandard rental housing.21' If a municipality de-
sires a parcel of land, a private owner must sell it at the mar-
ket value ten years prior to the time of sale.212 The expropria-
tion law evidences strong governmental bias in favor of grant-
ing the ability to take land and then dispute the price.213
Thus, in Sweden, affordable housing begins with
governmentally-controlled land costs. Most developable land is
removed from the speculative market by the land banking sys-
tem.214 Having acquired land at extremely reasonable cost,
the municipality can sell it for current value plus the value of
any improvements. 5 Or, as is usually the case, it can enter
long term leases for the land with developers.216 By owning
vast amounts of developable land, municipalities can control
development. Enhancement of this power draws from the
municipalities' ownership of nonprofit housing companies and
from the legislative requirement that municipal governments
create and administer master development plans. State
subsidies for development are contingent upon housing devel-
opers complying with master plans which give the municipal
governments considerable enforcement power.218
Municipalities fund the purchase of land in several ways.
Since 1966 there has been a national loan program which
provides loans for 95% of the site value of acquired property.
210. DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 113; Carr & Smith, supra note 204, at
138.
211. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 168 (citing Suny Jussil,
Steering Mechanisms, in NEW TOWNS AND OLD 176-77 (Hans-Erland Heineman ed.,
1975)).
212. McGUIRE, supra note 90, at 191; see New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra
note 204, at 909.
213. MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 191; see also STRONG, supra note 5, at 63-64
(finding that "[i]n 1966, the expropriation law was amended so that possession of
the land passed as soon as the request to expropriate was approved").
214. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 175; Anas et al., supra note
124, at 36; see Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 451; Ambrose, supra note 67, at
169.
215. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 36.
216. Id.; New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 909.
217. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 35.
218. Id. at 48.
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The National Housing Board assesses site value.21 In addi-
tion, municipal governments have their own sources of reve-
nue, bank loans, and nationally-approved bonds to cover costs
of land acquisition." Land banking can be financially self-
sustaining. In the early 1960s, Stockholm's aggressive land
banking program brought in more rent dollars than it
spent."' Affordability of housing built on leased land can be
maintained by raising rents only for commercially and indus-
trially leased land as land value appreciates.2' Although fi-
nancial gains from land development are not available to the
building industry in Sweden, valuable incentives exist for con-
struction companies if they follow the rules.' They must
seek approval for construction from the municipality and follow
the master development plan promulgated by municipal gov-
ernments, as well as comply with all building codes. 4 If they
do follow the rules, they profit greatly from the state-subsi-
dized financing of housing construction. The builders benefit
from the savings in land cost by the cash flow created for state
construction loans. Furthermore, builders gain business from
the consistent source of developable land.2" State financing
has accounted for the lion's share of construction since World
War II.6 One hundred percent of the cost of construction of
multifamily housing is financed by the national government, as
is 72% to 99% of the cost of single-family homes. 7 The state
subsidizes rehabilitation as well as new construction and, for
the last ten years, has subsidized loans for repairs and mainte-
nance in multifamily housing.2"
The final way the national and municipal governments in
Sweden subsidize housing involves expenditures for housing
consumption.' Sweden has had a housing allowance system
219. See STRONG, supra note 5, at 64.
220. Id. at 61.
221. Id. at 62.
222. New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 910.
223. See DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 110, 116.
224. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 48; see Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at
449; MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 195.
225. See DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 116.
226. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 44; see Ambrose, supra note 67, at 168-69;
Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 446.
227. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 44.
228. Id. at 51.
229. Id. at 56; see Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 450.
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since the 1930s." Currently, the housing allowances are de-
termined based on a formula combining a number of factors,
including family size, household income, and housing costY
The housing subsidies operate so that rents never exceed more
than 25% of a person's income, 2 and currently assist 26% of
all homeowners, 33% of cooperative dwellers, and 42% of all
tenants.' Middle income families benefit from housing al-
lowances so no stigma attaches to housing subsidization.' In
addition to direct housing allowances, the national government
indirectly subsidizes housing through mortgage interest deduc-
tions for homeownersY5 A closer examination of the forms of
housing tenure will illuminate the strengths and problems of
each.
C. Forms of Housing Tenure
Housing tenure in Sweden is a choice between three basic
forms. People looking for housing can choose to be renters,
cooperative dwellers, or homeowners. The rental sector com-
prises 43% of the housing market, divided about equally be-
tween private and public housing. 6 Homeowners account for
42% of housing consumers and cooperative owners represent
15% of all housing dwellers. 7
230. H&rsman & Quigley, supra note 3, at 23.
231. Id.; Anas et al., supra note 124, at 56.
232. See Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 544 (citing B. HEADEY, HOUSING POLICY
IN THE DEVELOPED EcONOMY 57 (1978)). National policy sets tenant rents at no
more than 20% of income. MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 198.
233. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 172; Appelbaum, supra note
67, at 544.
234. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 172; Appelbaum, supra
note 67, at 544.
235. MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 194-95.
236. Tommy Berger & Bengt Turner, Windfall Gains on the Swedish Housing
Market: The Effects of Queueing for a Cooperative Dwelling, 19 J. AM. REAL EST.
& URB. ECON. Ass'N 161, 163 (1991).
237. Id. Prior to 1970, rental apartments amounted to over 70% of housing.
HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 131, at 215. Since 1975, the percentages have re-
mained relatively consistent. From 1975 to 1985 the figures were: 42% homeown-
ers; 16% cooperative dwellers; and 42% renters. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at
452.
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1. Rental Housing
Of the three forms of housing tenure, rental housing bears
the banner as the most regulated." s Although rental housing
occurs in both the private and public housing spheres, private
rental housing operates under the control of public housing. In
terms of setting rents, meeting housing standards, and deter-
mining security of tenure, the public sphere leads the way. 9
This domination by the public housing market results from the
existence of Municipal Housing Corporations (MHCs) which
have acted as vehicles of the state, managing public housing
since 19 3 5 ."° The MHCs were not given much power until
after World War H. Once housing became a national priority,
MHCs had an integral part to play in the ambitious plans for
housing development.241
As suggested by the name, MHCs are controlled financial-
ly by the municipalities. The municipal governments also ap-
point the MHCs' Boards of Directors. Primarily dominated by
the Social Democratic Party throughout Sweden's modern his-
tory, the MHCs' tasks have been to develop, own, and operate
nonprofit housing. 42 Not only have they succeeded in doing
so, they have also maintained public housing of comparable
quality to other housing tenures.243 Since private rents are
pegged to public rents, the ability of the public sphere to sup-
ply quality housing on a nonprofit basis results in affordable
rents for both the public and private housing markets.244 Pri-
vate landlords have to buy into the state's system of rent-set-
ting because their ability to seek state-subsidized housing
loans depends on their adherence to that system.245
The present system of establishing rents has existed since
1968.6 Rents are determined on an annual basis pursuant
238. See Berger & Turner, supra note 236, at 163.
239. Kemeny, supra note 98, at 4; see Ambrose, supra note 67, at 165.
240. Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 216.
241. Id.; see also Anas et al., supra note 124, at 37 (discussing the rise of non-
profit housing companies after World War II).
242. Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 216. The housing developed by MHCs is
also labelled "council" and "social" housing. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 446.
243. Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 215; see Kemeny, supra note 98, at 4.
244. See Kemeny, supra note 98, at 4-5.
245. Id. at 6.
246. Id. The system was originally created by the Rent Act of 1968.
GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 171.
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to negotiations between the municipal housing corporations
and tenants' associations." A complicated system of rent-
averaging and cost-pooling forms the basis of rent-setting.2'
To arrive at the cost of maintaining one of its rental dwellings,
the MHC determines the cost of funding and maintaining its
entire stock of housing, and the cost of constructing any new
housing, and then divides this figure by the number of public
housing rental units. This average cost is adjusted based on
individual characteristics of the dwelling, in negotiation with
tenants' unions. In addition, the tenants' unions participate in
this process by having access to and reviewing the records of
the MHC.249 If any unresolvable dispute occurs in the negoti-
ations, the National Committee on the Rental Market hears
and decides appeals." ° Since rents are negotiated yearly to
reflect the actual cost of maintaining housing and, at times,
expanding the supply of housing, the nonprofitability of the
housing endures."5
Once rents are resolved with the MHCs, the tenants' un-
ions must negotiate with private landlords. 2 The "use value"
determination for apartment dwellings is applied to the private
housing market to achieve comparable rents. 3 Private rental
dwellings are compared to public housing dwellings in terms of
their size and amenities and are priced accordingly.' Com-
parable dwellings should have comparable rents, 5 and all
rents should be reasonable due to the nonprofit nature of the
entire systemY The most controversial aspect of the rent-
setting system addresses the reality that older apartments and
much newer apartments are priced the same. The use value
247. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 171; Hfirsman & Quigley,
supra note 3, at 22; see MILNER, supra note 10, at 198-99.
248. See Kemeny, supra note 98, at 7 (referring to the rent-setting procedure
as "Byzantine in its complexity").
249. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 52.
250. Id. at 53.
251. See id. at 51; Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 221.
252. Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 221 (citing Hyresforhandlingslag, Swedish
Code of Statutes 304 (1978)).
253. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 51; see also GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM,
supra note 3, at 171 (using the term "utilization value"); see generally Kemeny,
supra note 98, at 6-7.
254. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 171-72.
255. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 450.
256. Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 220-21.
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system does not adjust for dwelling age. Since most public
housing is relatively recent and most private housing stock is
older, private housing tenants subsidize public housing tenants
in their rental payments. 7
The combination of the rent-setting system, the housing
allowance program, and tenant protections guarantees afford-
able housing for Swedish renters. Furthermore, housing stabil-
ity crosses public and private divisions. In contrast to the Unit-
ed States, where private landlords can evict tenants for any
but discriminatory reasons,' Swedish landlords cannot evict
tenants except for good reason, such as nonpayment of rent,
serious tenant misconduct, or a legitimate need by the landlord
for personal use of the apartment. 9 In addition, tenants in
public housing have gained considerable power over housing
management decisions.6
The MHCs must also provide equal opportunity housing
under national policy.2"' In Sweden, this goal means that
public housing becomes available to middle income families as
well as to families with limited financial means. Consequently,
class barriers are broken down, with many middle income
tenants residing in public housing.2 Single-parent house-
holds comprise a majority proportion of the overall population
of public housing tenants.263
However, housing availability and choice are limited by
the system for allocation of apartments. Prospective tenants
obtain newer apartments by filling out applications and wait-
ing in a public "queue."" For some potential renters, the
queue contains the only hope of entering the housing market.
257. See Kemeny, supra note 98, at 7; GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note
3, at 178; MILNER, supra note 10, at 199.
258. ROBERT S. SCHOsIuNsKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 56
(1980).
259. See MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 198; Anas et al., supra note 124, at 37.
This is not to suggest, however, that Sweden is an eviction-less society. There
exist precariously-housed families in Sweden, most of whom depend on the state
for income and are unemployed. See Stenberg, supra note 137, at 103-04, 106.
260. See Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 454-55; Lundqvist, supra note 200,
at 230.
261. Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 219.
262. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 169.
263. NEW HOUSEHOLDS NEW HOUSING 84 (Karen A. Franck & Sherry
Ahrentzen eds., 1989); see Lundqvist, supra note 200, at 226.
264. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 53.
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Distribution of apartments takes place according to priorities.
People with special physical or emotional needs, people being
involuntarily displaced, and people residing in overcrowded
conditions are given preferential placement in the queue."5
All others must wait their turn. Households may legally swap
apartments as long as no financial arrangements exist in the
swap. 6 The benefits of legal swapping become available only
to families already in possession of an apartment. This system
can prove disadvantageous to young adults living with parents
who wish to find their own apartments but do not fall within
the priorities.
In summary, the Swedish rental housing system largely
succeeds at providing affordable, quality housing in a primarily
nonsegregatory, nondiscriminatory manner. While the system's
future depends on sustained subsidies from the national gov-
ernment, it remains a stable resource for a country intent on
providing affordable housing to all its people.
2. Cooperative Housing
Sweden's cooperative housing program established itself at
the vanguard of housing reform in the early 1920s.267 The
first cooperative association, the National Association of
Tenants' Savings and Building Societies (HSB), came into
being during tough economic times, enabling tenants to become
owners by subsidizing loans and providing technical assistance.
Growing to national proportions within a decade, HSB inspired
democratically controlled tenants' associations for each local
cooperative it developed. The hard economic times of the 1940s
saw the creation of a second cooperative association, Svenska
Riksbyggen.26s These two pioneering cooperative associations
are national in scope and continue to grow, currently compris-
ing two-thirds of all cooperatives in Sweden.269 They both
have county and municipal branches with tenants' associations
265. See id. at 55-56.
266. Id. at 28, 56.
267. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 167 (citing OWE
LUNDEVALL, SWEDISH EXPERIENCE OF Co-OPERATIVE HOUSING: INFOR ATION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON HUMAN SETTLEMENT HABITAT 3-4 (1976)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 168.
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in each building.27° Fifteen percent of all dwellings in Sweden
were cooperatively owned by 1980.271
As in the United States, cooperative ownership of housing
represents a cross between rental housing and home owner-
ship. 72  Members buy into the cooperatives with a
downpayment and "own" apartments by virtue of their control
of the cooperative association which owns the building. Rental
payments reflect actual maintenance costs and collective debt
of the building, preserving the nonprofit character of coopera-
tive housing.73 There are two paths toward cooperative own-
ership depending on whether one pursues a newly constructed
dwelling or an older dwelling. New cooperative dwellings main-
tain fixed downpayments and rent prices and must be applied
for through a queue." Depending on the location and desir-
ability of a particular apartment, the wait may be as much as
ten years. 5 Older cooperative dwellings may be purchased
on the open market. 76
Interest subsidies ease the financial burden of purchasing
a cooperative, and tax laws work to the benefit of cooperative
owners by providing deductions on the interest payments on
loans. 7 Until 1969, there existed resale controls on the cost
of a cooperative apartment which worked to maintain the
affordability of this housing tenure. 8 These controls no lon-
ger exist, thus the buyer of a new cooperative who benefits
from subsidized loans may sell at the price the market will
bear. 79 Older dwellings are also available on the open mar-
ket." With demand for cooperative apartments outpacing
supply since the 1980s,"' prices have steadily risen and high-
270. See id. at 167.
271. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 169; see OIBSON, supra note
87, at 268.
272. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 168; Berger & Turner,
supra note 236, at 163.
273. Berger & Turner, supra note 236, at 164.
274. Id. at 161.
275. Id. at 165.
276. Id. at 162.
277. Id. at 165.
278. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 175-76; Appelbaum, supra
note 67, at 547; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 456.
279. See Appelbaum, supra note 67, at 547-48.
280. Berger & Turner, supra note 236, at 164.
281. See OISSON, supra note 87, at 268; Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at
456.
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er income households favorably compete against lower income
households in the quest for cooperative housing.2" Conse-
quently, the market demand for cooperative housing has seri-
ously jeopardized its affordability for low income families.
3. Single Family Homeownership
In the wake of the million dwellings program and the
resultant end of the housing shortage, Swedish attention
turned to single family housing.' The market for single fam-
ily dwellings has increased in Sweden over the years.' Not
all, but most, single family homes are privately owned." The
rise in popularity of homeownership since the 1980s coincides
with an increase in the number of middle income families. 6
The desire for a single family, suburban home with a yard has
infiltrated the Swedish middle class consciousness. '
As in the cooperative sector, problems with affordability of
single family homes quickly followed from the increase in de-
mand. Buyers of newly-constructed houses are eligible for a
state loan to subsidize the purchase price." The initial price
of a new house is based on an estimated cost of actual con-
struction plus a low land cost. 9 In return for the state subsi-
dy, the purchaser cannot profit from resale of the house for
three years."' Although each purchaser only receives one
subsidy in a lifetime, the house can thereafter be sold at a
profit. Determined by the free market upon resale,"' the
price of single family homes began to bear little resemblance to
the initial construction cost.
292
The inequities of single family homeownership are com-
282. See Berger & Turner, supra note 236, at 161, 181; Lundqvist et al., supra
note 95, at 456.
283. Vogel, supra note 130, at 141; MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 191; see HECLO
& MADSEN, supra note 131, at 215.
284. OLSqON, supra note 87, at 268; see MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 191, 197;
Vogel, supra note 130, at 141.
285. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 37.
286. See GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 165.
287. See id. at 175; Vogel, supra note 130, at 154.
288. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 48; see MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 197.
289. MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 197; see Anas et al., supra note 124, at 51.
290. Anas et al., supra note 124, at 51.
291. Berger & Turner, supra note 236, at 164.
292. See MCGUIRE, supra note 90, at 197.
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pounded by the fact that some cash outlay is necessary to buy
a house."3 Families with limited means find homeownership
beyond their grasp." With decreased ability to buy into
homeownership, the people who need economic opportunities
the most remain least likely to benefit from resale profit. In
addition, homeownership represents an economic boom to
those able to afford it due to the associated tax benefits. Home-
owners deduct mortgage interest payments from their income
tax liability, reaping great financial benefit."9 It is estimated
that the Swedish government spends over half its housing
budget on homeowner tax deductions.9 6 Long term housing
affordability in the cooperative and single family
homeownership tenures remains somewhat elusive, due to the
vagaries of unregulated markets. As the demographics of
Sweden's population change, becoming increasingly middle in-
come, there appears a need to rethink housing availability and
distribution in order to maintain tenure choice without class
distinction.
4. The Potential Problem of Segregation
One other potential problem which lurks on the horizon is
segregation of socioeconomic groups. 7 Immigration of refu-
gees from various ethnic backgrounds has steadily increased in
Sweden since the 1930s.29 After World War II, immigrants
from other Nordic countries were welcomed in Sweden due to
mutual agreements to abolish visa requirements. Although
293. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 453.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 449, 450; GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 178.
296. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 179. In contrast, the United
States spends at least 80% of its housing budget on foregone revenues from home-
owner tax deductions. James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America. An Historical and
Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United
States, 22 HoW. L.J. 547, 603-08 (1979). See also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent
Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619,
1627-28, 1631-37 (1993) (assessing the extent of federal government subsidies for
homeowners and proposing a redistribution of housing subsidies in the United
States).
297. GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 175; see DICKENS ET AL.,
supra note 80, at 52-53.
298. Anna-Lisa Linden & G6ran Lindberg, Immigrant Housing Patterns in Swe-
den, in URBAN HOUSING SEGREGATION OF MINORITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES 92, 93 (Elizabeth D. Huttman et al. eds., 1991).
[Vol. MXI:100
HOUSING JUSTICE IN SWEDEN
immigrants from Italy, Hungary, and Austria were actively
recruited to fill labor needs after World War II, it was not until
the 1960s when "[i]mmigrants from outside the Nordic region
became a more noticeable feature of Swedish society."299 The
Swedish parliament began to regulate non-Nordic immigration
in 1968, requiring work permits, jobs, or refugee status for
non-Nordic immigrants entering the country."0
By the mid-1970s, the Swedish government began to set
policies to avoid segregatory patterns of housing. With the
objective of fostering understanding and cooperation among
people of different backgrounds, socioeconomic and cultural
integration and equality became a priority."1 Two forms of
housing segregation endure in Sweden: ethnic and economic.
Economic segregation precipitated by unequal availability of
housing across tenure lines has been discussed.0 2 As previ-
ously discussed, problems of economic segregation were allevi-
ated by increasing the availability of different tenures in
homeownership and maintaining housing affordability. Al-
though economic segregation still exists, the high quality of
housing for all Swedes mitigates against the development of
"slums" for lower income households.0 3
Although the majority of Swedes live in quality housing,
ethnic housing segregation still remains a problem. Immi-
grants comprise 8.5% of the Swedish population, with 5.5%
being from other Scandinavian countries." 4 The worst segre-
gation is experienced by the most recent immigrant groups
(Chileans, Turks, and Vietnamese) and groups of immigrants
exhibiting differences in appearance (Africans, Asians, and
Turks) from the Swedes. °5 Nevertheless, this ethnic housing
segregation does not seem to result from discriminatory prac-
tices, either individual or systemic, but rather appears to be a
product of the voluntary settlement patterns of immi-
299. Id. at 94-95.
300. See id. at 97.
301. Stenberg, supra note 137, at 103-04; see Lundqvist et al., supra note 95,
at 449 (citing Riktlinjer for bostadspolitiken mm [Guidelines for Housing Policy],
Cabinet Proposal 150 (1974)); Linden & Lindberg, supra note 298, at 98-99.
302. Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 458, 462; see Vogel, supra note 130, at
139, 140.
303. See Linden & Lindberg, supra note 298, at 99, 108, 112.
304. DICKENS ET AL., supra note 80, at 54.
305. See Linden & Lindberg, supra note 298, at 104, 107.
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grants."' In Sweden, opportunities exist to gradually im-
prove one's income and housing. Immigrants can achieve hous-
ing equity.
30 7
In reality, there is little sign in Sweden of the serious
problems experienced in most industrialized countries involv-
ing segregation and marginalization of low income people.
While there is some economic and ethnic segregation, housing
standards still remain acceptable for people with low in-
comes.08 Moreover, the number of people living in poverty is
relatively small, and the difference in income level between
average income and low income continues to be moderate.3 9
In contrast to Sweden's generally homogenous population,
the United States' heterogenous population suffers from hous-
ing segregation so severe it has been referred to as "American
Apartheid."310 Deliberate housing segregation of minority
groups in central cities has been practiced by federal, state,
and local governments on behalf of the American people.31'
The difference in severity of housing segregation and stan-
dards between the two countries highlights the inherent rac-
ism that precipitates the locational isolation of people who look
different than the majority. It becomes difficult not to wonder
whether the United States' lack of effective measures to reme-
dy its affordable housing crisis is also a symptom of its racism.
V. LEARNING FROM SWEDEN'S SUCCESS
The goal of comparing Sweden's accomplishment with the
United States' failure to provide affordable housing has been to
demonstrate the ingredients necessary for developing a suc-
cessful housing program in the United States. Despite the
social, political, and economic differences between the two
countries, transplantation of the Swedish system to the United
306. Id. at 102, 113.
307. Id. at 102; see id. at 104, 113.
308. See MILNER, supra note 10, at 200. "Less than 1 per cent of Swedish
housing is substandard and only 5 per cent lacks modern stoves and refrigerators."
Id. (citing Sven Olsson, Sweden, in GROWTH TO LIMITS: THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
WELFARE STATES, THE CASE OF SWEDEN 1, 53-55 (1986)).
309. See GENERATING EQuALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE: THE SWEDISH EXPERI-
ENCE 21 (Inga Persson ed., 1990).
310. DOuGLAs S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID passim
(1993).
311. See id. at 3-4; see generally Kushner, supra note 296.
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States is achievable.312 Sweden's redistributive system of
housing creation and allocation operates in a capitalist market.
The conclusion cannot be avoided that it is a difference in
values that presents the greatest obstacle to implementation of
the Swedish system in the United States. People in the United
States will first have to place a high value on decent living
conditions for everyone before the success of Sweden can be
replicated.
Once housing justice receives a high value in the United
States, a great deal can be learned about the provision of af-
fordable housing from a study of Sweden. The old adage,
"where there's a will, there's a way," never rang so true for so
many people. "A decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment"'313 could become a reality for all residents in the United
States. The first step in solving the affordable housing crisis
remains simple: allocation of resources. This fact is obvious to
the Swedish people and the collective will has allowed the
Swedish government to effectuate a program of housing justice.
Equally important, however, and what Sweden has yet to
learn, is the need to maintain affordable housing beyond the
first generation inhabitant. The purpose of building nonmarket
housing is defeated if, after becoming a part of the existing
housing stock, market principles dominate resale. 14 If accom-
panied by mechanisms to maintain affordability, Sweden's
commitment to resource allocation and choice of tenure, its
system of land banking, and its municipal/regional control of
housing would become an almost foolproof model of providing
affordable housing.
312. ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 106 (1977) ("Very different so-
cial, political and economic circumstances may nonetheless be conducive to the
creation of the same legal rule"); see also K. Zweigert, Methodological Problems in
Comparative Law, 7 ISR. L. REV. 465, 469 (1972) ("It is a basic rule of compara-
tive law that different legal systems find equal or at least astonishingly similar
solutions--often down to the details-for similar problems, in spite of all differenc-
es in historical development, systematic and theoretical concepts and style of prac-
tice").
313. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994)).
314. See Lundqvist et al., supra note 95, at 462-63 (explaining that the prob-
lem of Sweden's system stems from market influence over housing in stages after
production of the housing causing "some households to enjoy considerable capital
gains in the owner-occupied and co-operative sectors"); GILBERBLOOM &
APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 176; Anas et al., supra note 124, at 51.
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Even without the dominance of a party like the Social
Democrats, housing equity could become a reality in the Unit-
ed States. 15 Acceptance of the market's failure to provide
housing for all people needs to occur first. The next step would
necessitate a true commitment to providing decent, affordable
housing to all people and the appropriation of resources neces-
sary to accomplish that realizable goal. The United States
could then emulate the successful practices of Sweden in ac-
quiring and providing affordable land and housing. Finally, the
United States could expand upon mechanisms for permanent
affordability of housing already in existence to become a torch-
bearer in maintaining housing affordability. Limited equity
cooperatives, community land trusts, and mutual housing asso-
ciations have become successful legal tools in maintaining
affordable housing in the United States. 16
Acquisition of land for public purposes is hardly a new
phenomenon in the United States. Land has been acquired by
federal, state, and local governments for highway development,
schools, industry, irrigation systems, and grazing areas in the
western United States."7 In that vein, land banking has long
been recognized as a process worthy of attention in addressing
the need for affordable housing in the United States and cur-
tailing the destructiveness of urban sprawl. In 1968, the Na-
tional Commission on Urban Problems (the Douglas Commis-
sion) stated:
The Commission recommends that State governments enact
legislation enabling State and/or local development authori-
ties or agencies of general purpose governments to acquire
315. Ideally, this realization will come as a positive, hopeful action, not a reac-
tion to the explosion of the "social powder keg." Feldman & Florida, supra note
24, at 44; see also GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 3, at 13 (submitting
that solutions to the housing crisis will be sought as conditions worsen).
316. For an extended discussion of these legal mechanisms which maintain
affordability of housing, see Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The American
Dream of Housing Justice for All, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69 (1995). This article
continues and complements the arguments for affordable housing put forth in my
earlier writings.
317. See New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 899 (land is readily
acquired for schools, highways, industry, and federal land reserves). One-third of
cities with 50,000 or more people acquire land for public purposes. Id. at 914; see
also A.M. Woodruff, Recycling Urban Land, in THE GoOD EARTH, supra note 67,
at 64 (government-owned land leased to ranchers for grazing is prevalent in the
west); id. at 139 (land acquired for irrigation systems).
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land in advance of development for the following purposes:
(a) assuring the continuing availability of sites needed for
development; (b) controlling the timing, location, type, and
scale of development; (c) preventing urban sprawl; and (d)
reserving to the public gains in land values resulting from
the action of government in promoting and servicing develop-
ment ....
The Commission recommends that the Congress
enact legislation establishing a Federal revolving fund to
facilitate the purchase of land by local governments in owner-
initiated compensation proceedings and as part of direct-
purchase programs, with the Federal contribution to be re-
turned to the fund upon disposition of the property."' 8
Given the American propensity for chaotic and unplanned
land development edging further away from central urban
areas, land banking could operate as an effective, comprehen-
sive, and deliberate form of land use planning.319 There are
examples of planned urban developments created through land
banking which exist in Columbia, Maryland; Reston, Virginia;
and the Irvine Ranch in California.32 ° Efficient development
of affordable housing for low income people could become a
reality as part of the comprehensive, thoughtful planning pro-
cess.32' Although the extended foresight exhibited by Sweden
318. SYLVAN KAMM, LAND BANKING: PUBLIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND DILEM-
MNAS 60 (1970) (quoting NAT L COI. ON URB. PROBS., BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY 250-52 (1968)); see New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 907
(citing U.S. NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION, PART
11: URBAN LANDS 12 (1941)); see also KAMM, supra, at 62 (the Kaiser Committee
recommendations, 1968); id. at 63 (the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1968); Steebuck, supra note 207, at 584 (finding that "American interest
in land banking began in the 1930's and reached an apogee during the 1970's;
interest seems to have abated in the [1980's]"); Fitch & Mack, supra note 67, at
139-141 (referencing the New York State Urban Development Corporation which
"owned outright $50 million of land and held several million more in leases and
options" in 1973).
319. See KAMM, supra note 318, at 11; Stoebuck, supra note 207, at 581; see
generally New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 897-99, 906-07; Fitch
& Mack, supra note 67, at 135-36, 142-43.
320. See Fitch & Mack, supra note 67, at 139; KAMM, supra note 318, at 8
n.14.
321. See New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 957 (finding that
"gl]and banking, in fact, is designed to succeed where established programs of slum
clearance, urban renewal, economic rejuvenation and the like have failed, because
it represents a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the problems of
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would be difficult to replicate, the acquisition of land on the
periphery of urban areas for future development could ease the
problems of urban development and offer reasonably priced
land for affordable housing development." People living in
central city neighborhoods, plagued with urban decay and
social disintegration, could benefit from housing developed for
low and moderate income people on newly-acquired land. Rede-
velopment of badly deteriorated central cities could then occur
in a methodical manner.32
Land banking could facilitate the introduction of much
needed regional control of land. Replicating approaches to
other regional issues of public concern, land banks could take
the form of public corporations, created by, but independent of
the government. 324 The land banks could work in conjunction
with regional land use planning agencies to accomplish sound,
studied, and logical land development planning. Pooling of
municipal resources would work well to create the financial
capacity to amass large parcels of land. Regional control would
be essential to the goals of a land bank since suburban areas
would be reluctant to relinquish self-interest in preservation of
the status quo.32 Large tracts of land, chosen for location,
affordability, and potential for future development, could be
acquired throughout a region by purchase or eminent do-
main.32 6 Empowering land banks with the ability to have a
first option on land for sale37 and to acquire options on agri-
urban deterioration and because it focuses attention on the urban fringe, as well
as the inner city"); see also Fitch & Mack, supra note 67, at 136 (referring also to
the resultant "homogenization of suburbs, along with segregation of racial and
income groups").
322. See New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 958-59; Stoebuck,
supra note 207, at 582.
323. See New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 933.
324. See id. at 942-43; KAMM, supra note 318, at 26-27; STRONG, supra note 5,
at 260-61; Fitch & Mack, supra note 67, at 141; Stoebuck, supra note 207, at 587.
325. Protection of the homogenous nature of suburbs could be expected. See
STRONG, supra note 5, at 271. Protection of the favorable imbalance of public
wealth enjoyed by the suburbs could also be expected. See generally Boger, supra
note 38, at 1300-04.
326. The issue of whether courts would allow the use of eminent domain for
land bank acquisitions has been dealt with extensively. See generally New Praxis
for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 959-61; KAMM, supra note 318, at 22;
Steebuck, supra note 207, at 594-605; STONE, supra note 5, at 270.
327. See STRONG, supra note 5, at 272 (finding that "[in Sweden and France,
the land bank agency must receive notice of all proposed sales and can preempt to
restrain speculation").
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cultural land before speculative increases in the value of farm
land took hold3" would encourage the attainment of its goals.
Regionally-controlled land could then be leased for develop-
ment, sold with restrictions, and/or utilized for affordable hous-
ing.
Land banking requires a significant amount of start-up
capital. 29 Although the capability of becoming self-supporting
exists, land banks are unavoidably expensive when beginning
with the large-scale efforts necessary for success. Government
financial assistance, along with debt financing and bond issu-
ance can combine to resourcefully initiate a land bank."°
Once acquired, the land can be held indefinitely, sold for a
profit, or leased through long term leases. 31 Any subsequent
appreciation in land value would then benefit the public, not
any individual landowner. 2 "The prevailing preference
among operating agencies is for the use of a long-term lease,
because this permits the land bank agency to benefit from
appreciation in land value, either through increased rents or
through a new lease for more intensive use." ' Land banks
have the potential to become self-supporting." Dedication of
328. See Fitch & Mack, supra note 67, at 148; STRONG, supra note 5, at 58.
329. New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 962; see KAMM, supra
note 318, at 29; STRONG, supra note 5, at 275.
330. See New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 945 (finding that
"[the financing component of the land bank's enabling legislation should grant the
power to borrow money and issue bonds for its corporate purposes and to secure
its indebtedness by pledging its own revenues or by encumbering its property");
KAMM, supra note 318, at 65 (citing the 1968 Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations report on "Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future
Growth"). Strong also found that "[v]irtually all land bank advocates believe that
federal financial participation is essential to place land bank agencies in a position
to acquire land at requisite speed and scale. The Douglas Commission recommend-
ed the creation of a federal revolving fund to make loans to local land bank agen-
cies." STRONG, supra note 5, at 275 (citing NAT'L COMM. ON URB. PROBS., BUILD-
ING THE AMERICAN CITY 251 (1968)).
331. See KAMM, supra note 318, at 49; New Praxis for Urban Growth, supra
note 204, at 963.
332. See STRONG, supra note 5, at 240-41; id. at 264 (quoting the Douglas
Commission: "Where actual purchase will result in the government's recapturing
increases in land values for the public, government should deem this a legitimate
function and an added incentive for direct action."); see also Fitch & Mack, supra
note 67, at 145.
333. STRONG, supra note 5, at 279-80.
334. KAMM, supra note 318, at 29 (finding that land banking may be financial-
ly self-sustaining); STRONG, supra note 5, at 275 (finding that land banks can be
expected to be profitable over time).
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the land to mixed use and linking development of affordable
housing to commercial and industrial use of the land would
provide a balance of investment and revenues, fostering eco-
nomic security for a land bank.335 Land banking would also
create benefits to society immeasurable in dollars and cents by
creating well-planned, thoughtful, diverse communities with
improved services.33
Assembling sizeable tracts of property in the land bank as
an affordable source of land for housing would be the first step
toward providing affordable housing. Developing housing that
provides people of all incomes with choice of tenure and loca-
tion is the next step. Creating housing subsidy programs so
that affordable housing is accessible to all is a further priority.
As seen from the weakness of the Swedish experience, the cru-
cial element then becomes maintaining affordability of hous-
ing. Reliable legal mechanisms emanating primarily from the
nonprofit housing sector exist to preserve affordability of hous-
ing. These mechanisms include limited equity housing coopera-
tives, community land trusts, and mutual housing associa-
tions.337 All of the legal structures can operate to remove
property value from the dictates of the market and, thereby,
control the long term resale value of property. Property ac-
quired by a land bank could be sold to a land trust with inher-
ent controls on resale value, or be leased with restrictions on
resale. The initial investment in the land, whether public or
private, would be spent wisely and assure affordability of hous-
ing for future generations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sweden's comprehensive housing program provides clear
evidence that once a government commitment to affordable
housing is made, legal mechanisms exist to achieve that goal.
The United States can use the experience and techniques
adopted in Sweden to move toward a goal of decent, affordable
housing for all, making it a reality rather than a dream. By
combining land banking, regional control, and equal opportuni-
335. See KAMM, supra note 318, at 29; STRONG, supra note 5, at 275; Fitch &
Mack, supra note 67, at 153; Stoebuck, supra note 207, at 585; New Praxis for
Urban Growth, supra note 204, at 963-64.
336. See Stoebuck, supra note 207, at 593.
337. See supra note 293.
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ty of housing with mechanisms to maintain housing
affordability, the United States can achieve the goal expressed
in the National Housing Act of 1949.
The essential underpinnings of a national housing policy
which works for all people include regional control of land use
planning to break down the artificial, divisive, and economical-
ly and societally expensive barriers between cities and sub-
urbs; land banking to begin the process of controlling
affordability of property; development of housing affordable to
all; and resale controls to maintain affordability. When the
United States chooses to carry out its promise to provide de-
cent, affordable housing to everyone, the workable approach
will be evident. When the time arrives for a true commitment
to housing justice, communities can be built upon mutual shar-
ing of limited resources rather than individual greed. Housing
justice means access to property and affordable housing for
everyone, and thus benefits all.
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